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Abstract
Background: Only a minority of probable SARS cases caused transmission. We assess if any
epidemiological or clinical factors in SARS index patients were associated with increased probability
of transmission.
Methods: We used epidemiological and clinical data on probable SARS patients admitted to Tan
Tock Seng Hospital. Using a case-control approach, index patients who had probable SARS who
subsequently transmitted the disease to at least one other patient were analysed as "cases" against
patients with no transmission as "controls", using multivariate logistic regression analysis.
Results: 98 index patients were available for analysis (22 with transmission, 76 with no
transmission). Covariates positively associated with transmission in univariate analysis at p < 0.05
included delay to isolation (Day 7 of illness or later), admission to a non-isolation facility, pre-
existing chronic respiratory disease and immunosuppressive disease, need for oxygen, shortness of
breath, vomiting, and higher lactate dehydrogenase levels and higher neutrophil counts. In the
multivariate analysis, only three factors were significant: delay to isolation, admission to a non-
isolation facility and higher lactate dehydrogenase levels of >650 IU/L (OR 6.4, 23.8 and 4.7
respectively).
Conclusion: Clinical and epidemiological factors can help us to explain why transmission was
observed in some instances but not in others.
Background
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was the first
emerging infectious disease of the new century with epi-
demic potential. First recognized on 26 Feb 2003, SARS
spread rapidly and resulted in 8098 reported cases and
774 deaths in close to 30 countries [1]. While there was no
endemic transmission in the majority of these countries,
explosive outbreaks were observed in China, Hong Kong,
Taiwan, Canada, Vietnam and Singapore. Ongoing
research points to an existing animal reservoir for the virus
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[2,3], and future epidemics may hence sporadically
emerge from this source [4].
A key feature in the epidemiology of SARS is the wide-
spread variation in the number of secondary infections
caused by each potentially infectious case. While multiple
secondary infections were traced to single individuals in
several super-spreading events [5-7], the majority of
infected individuals did not cause any secondary infec-
tions [7].
A recent paper showed that the efficiency of outbreak con-
trol measures could be greatly enhanced if there were pre-
dictive methods for identifying infectious individuals [8].
However, a review by Yu and Sung noted that the key risk
factors for transmission remain largely unknown [9].
While two previous papers attempted to identify risk fac-
tors for onward transmission from index patients [10,11],
both studies were restricted to household contacts, and
neither accounted for factors such as clinical presentation,
immune status and disease severity in the index patient,
all of which have been suspected to play a role in disease
transmission [9].
In this study, we analysed epidemiological and clinical
data on probable SARS patients admitted to Tan Tock
Seng Hospital. We attempted to identify if any of these
factors could explain if individual index patients had
transmitted the disease by the time they were detected and
isolated, and developed a simple model for explaining the
variability in secondary transmission.
Methods
We used data collected during the outbreak of SARS in
Singapore from 1 March to 31 May 2003. Diagnosis of
probable SARS was based on the standard WHO case def-
initions dated 1st May 2003 [12]. Briefly, it required a
patient to have fever, respiratory symptoms and a signifi-
cant contact history, in the presence of a chest radiograph
consistent with pneumonia or adult respiratory distress
syndrome, or laboratory assays diagnostic of SARS. We
defined an index patient as any individual who had been
established, during contact tracing investigations, to have
come into effective contact with susceptible individuals,
be it in healthcare, household or other social settings. This
study included all individuals who were part of the chain
of transmission within Tan Tock Seng Hospital – i.e. all
index patients causing secondary infections within
(TTSH), as well as all individuals exposed in TTSH who, in
the course of follow-up surveillance and contact tracing,
were found to have contracted SARS, and hence also
became index patients. Index patients within TTSH were
identified from outbreak investigations by on-site epide-
miologists [13]. The hospital contact tracing team was
also updated on individuals exposed in TTSH who were
subsequently confirmed to be infected. This information
was obtained, either when these infected individuals
returned to us for clinical assessment, or through the Min-
istry of Health in the event that these infected individuals
presented elsewhere. The team then collated epidemio-
logical information on dates of onset, admission and iso-
lation for these index patients, and verified with other
healthcare institutions and the Ministry of Health if these
index patients had in turn caused any secondary transmis-
sion in either nosocomial or community settings.
Secondary infections were linked to an index patient if
either of the following criteria were met:
- there was effective contact between the index patient and
the secondarily infected patient, either as recalled by the
index patient or the secondarily infected patient, or docu-
mented in medical notes (eg. of physical examination of
an index patient by a healthcare worker who became sec-
ondarily infected)
- there were movement records indicating that effective
contact could have occurred between an index patient and
a secondarily infected patient, with the same movement
records indicating that no other index patients could be
an alternative source of infection Eg. an index patient
sharing the same room/cubicle as a secondarily infected
patient, even if neither patient could give a history of
direct contact with each other, as long as no other infec-
tious SARS cases were detected in the same general area
In situations where a secondary infection could be linked
to more than one index case, the first index patient with
whom the secondary infection came into effective contact
with was considered to be the source of the infection.
Effective contact was defined as conversation or physical
contact within a 1 metre distance, where the index patient
had to already be symptomatic from SARS, and the onset
of symptoms for the secondarily infected patient had to be
2 to 10 days after the exposure which presumptively led to
the infection.
The above criteria were then used to classify all index
patients as to whether the index patient had transmitted
SARS to one or more other individuals, which was our
outcome of interest. In the case-control analysis, index
patients who caused at least one secondary infection were
analysed as "cases"; all index patients who did not cause
any secondary infections were analysed as "controls".
Exposure variables of interest included the demographic,
epidemiological and clinical features associated with indi-
vidual index patients. Epidemiological variables were the
context of the exposure to SARS for that index patient, the
date of illness onset relative to the implementation of per-
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sonal protective equipment (PPE) across the entire hospi-
tal on 22nd Mar 2003, delayed isolation, and admission to
a non-isolation ward. We defined delayed isolation as
admission to isolation wards on Day 7 of illness or later,
as an exploratory analysis of the data showed a sharp rise
in the proportion causing secondary infections from Day
7 (Figure 1). Isolation wards were facilities where visitors
were disallowed, and where healthcare staff wore special-
ized personal protective equipment while managing
patients. All other wards are hereafter referred to as non-
isolation wards. This included general wards and inten-
sive care units (ICU) and high dependency (HD) wards
where isolation precautions had not been instituted by
the time the index patient for that ward was admitted.
Clinical signs and symptoms, as well as laboratory and
radiological investigations, were obtained from a clinical
database maintained for all probable SARS patients
admitted to TTSH. Index patients were coded on whether
key clinical signs and symptoms were absent or present on
the date the patient was moved to isolation. For labora-
tory investigations, we used the results of tests carried out
closest in time to the date of isolation. Co-morbid chronic
illnesses were grouped as those with possible impact on
respiratory function (pre-existing ischemic heart disease/
congestive cardiac failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease), and those that could suppress the immune status
(diabetes mellitus, chronic renal failure, malignancies,
chronic immunosuppressive therapies).
We then identified factors significantly associated with
secondary transmission through a univariate analysis. In
the multivariate analyses, we started from the most signif-
icant factor identified in the univariate analysis, and then
performed a forward step-wise regression, using the likeli-
hood ratio test to see if inclusion of the next covariate sig-
nificantly improved the fit of the multivariate model.
Odds ratio and their 95% confidence intervals are pre-
sented as estimates of the effect sizes. The final multivari-
ate model was then used to model the probability of
transmission for combinations of individual patient char-
acteristics.
All statistical analyses were performed using Stata V9.0
(Stata Corp, Tex) for Windows, with the level of signifi-
cance set at 5%.
Ethical Approval
Ethical approval for the clinical database and its subse-
quent use in this study was granted by the TTSH Hospital
SARS Clinical Management Workgroup and the institu-
tional representative for the hospital.
Proportion of cases with secondary transmission, by time of isolationFigure 1
Proportion of cases with secondary transmission, by time of isolation.
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Results
In all, 106 individuals satisfied our study inclusion criteria
of being part of the chain of transmission within TTSH.
Epidemiological investigations identified secondary
transmission in 24 index patients, including 4 which were
involved in super-spreading events; 10 of the 24 index
patients caused secondary transmission within TTSH
itself, while another 14 index patients caused secondary
transmission in other healthcare institutions and/or the
community. Two index patients with secondary transmis-
sion, and six index patients without secondary transmis-
sion, had to be excluded due to missing information on
key variables. In all, 22 index patients who transmitted the
disease were analysed as "cases", against 76 index patients
with no identifiable secondary transmission serving as the
"controls".
Table 1 presents the characteristics of our study popula-
tion. In all, 58% were infected in the course of their duty
as healthcare workers. Another 10% were infected while
admitted as inpatients of TTSH for unrelated medical con-
ditions and, with the exception of the imported index
patient, the remainder was infected while visiting friends
and relatives in TTSH. 90% of our cases eventually devel-
oped radiographic abnormalities, and positive confirma-
tory tests for SARS-CoV infection were available for 93%
of the study patients. Median values for the laboratory
investigations fell within the accepted reference ranges;
for all subsequent analysis, we compared index patients
with the most extreme quartile of results against all other
index patients.
Table 2 compares index patients with and without trans-
mission. None of the demographic characteristics were
significantly associated with increased risk of transmis-
sion. However, index patients originally infected as inpa-
tients were more likely to transmit the disease. Delay to
isolation and admission to a non-isolation facility were
both strongly associated with transmission. In terms of
clinical characteristics, pre-existing chronic respiratory
disease and immunosuppressive disease were more likely
to be associated with increased risk of transmission. There
were also indications that index patients with more severe
illness were more likely to transmit the disease; while 4/
22 (18%) of the index patients who transmitted the dis-
ease had been admitted to ICU or HD by the time of iso-
lation, this was observed in none of the index patients
who did not transmit the disease (p = 0.002, Fisher's exact
test). Moreover, the need for oxygen, shortness of breath,
vomiting, and higher lactate dehydrogenase levels and
higher neutrophil counts, were all more frequent in index
patients who transmitted the disease.
The results of the multivariate logistic regression are pre-
sented in Table 3. On multivariate analysis, the strongest
predictor of transmission was admission to a non-isola-
tion ward, followed by delay in isolation, and having a
lactate dehydrogenase value >650IU/L. No significant
interactions were identified between these three covari-
ates.
We used the coefficients given in Table 3 to construct a
tool for predicting if an index patient would have caused
transmission by the time he/she is identified and isolated.
The predicted probabilities (pi) of transmission in Table 4
are calculated for the ith individual (i = 1 to 98), using the
equation below,
where x1, x2, and x3 are indicator variables taking on the
values of 1 for those with delayed isolation, admission to
a non-isolation ward, and lactate dehydrogenase > 650
IU/L respectively; the term takes the value of 0 in the
absence of each respective indicator.
The results of the predictive model (Table 4) illustrate the
wide variability in transmission observed between index
patients. While index patients with two or more risk fac-
tors have a predicted probability of transmission exceed-
ing 0.5, they comprise only 20% of our study population.
If we use the model in a predictive fashion, we see that,
under the best-case scenario, when no risk factors are
present at the point of isolation, the predicted probability
that transmission has occurred is less than 5%. In con-
trast, in a situation where all the three significant risk fac-
tors are present, the model predicts that there is a 97%
chance of secondary transmission having occurred.
An ROC for the model was plotted (not shown). The area
under the curve was 0.903 (95%CI 0.832–0.974), indicat-
ing that the model had a very good ability to discriminate
index patients with secondary transmission from those
with no secondary transmission.
Discussion
Our study confirms previous observations that the major-
ity of SARS transmission is caused by a minority of cases
[7]. Moreover, we have identified several key factors asso-
ciated with an increased probability of transmission, and
show that the main determinants were delayed isolation
(Day 7 or later), admission to a non-isolation ward, and
higher lactate dehydrogenase values at the time of isola-
tion. These findings are important in several ways.
Firstly, our findings improve the current understanding of
SARS transmission. While the importance of delayed iso-
ln . . . .
p
p
x x xi
i
i i i1
3 15 1 86 1 3 17 2 1 55 3
−
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ = − + + +
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Table 1: Demographic, epidemiological, clinical, and laboratory features of study patients
Demographics n (%)
Age
- < = 24 23 23.5%
- 25 to 49 61 62.2%
- 50 and above 14 14.3%
Female gender 79 80.6%
Non-Chinese ethnicity 40 40.8%
Epidemiological features n (%)
Context of exposure to SARS
- healthcare worker 57 58.2%
- hospital inpatient 10 10.2%
- *others 31 31.6%
Date of onset
- 21/3/03 or earlier (before universal PPE) 78 79.6%
- 22/3//03 or later (after universal PPE) 20 20.4%
Delayed isolation (on Day 7 or later) 34 34.7%
Ever admitted to a non-isolation ward 12 12.2%
Ever admitted to a non-isolation ward 12 12.2%
Clinical features n (%)
Chronic illness
- chronic respiratory illness 7 7.1%
- disease with immunosuppression 10 10.2%
Disease severity at time of isolation
- had an abnormal chest radiograph 78 79.6%
- required oxygen therapy 14 14.3%
- admitted to intensive care or high dependency 4 4.1%
- intubated 2 2.0%
Signs and symptoms at time of isolation
- temperature > = 38°C 74 75.5%
- fever 95 96.9%
- cough 55 56.1%
- dyspnoea 24 24.5%
- vomiting 17 17.3%
- diarrhoea 14 14.3%
Chest radiograph and confirmatory tests for SARS
- ever had abnormal CXR 88 89.8%
- positive PCR specimen 13 13.3%
- positive serology 91 92.9%
^Other laboratory investigations Median (IQR)
- highest alanine aminotransferase (7–36 IU/L) 21 (14–41)
- highest lactate dehydrogenase (200–500 IU/L) 447 (348–650)
- lowest platelet count (160-390*10^9/L) 184 (145–220)
- highest neutrophil count (4-10*10^9/L) 3.36 (2.35–5.04)
- lowest lymphocyte count (1.5-4.3*10^9/L) 0.93 (0.66–1.21)
*others: original imported index patient and hospital visitors
^reference ranges given in brackets
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Table 2: Univariate analysis of factors associated with transmission of SARS
Patients with secondary 
transmission
Patients with no 
secondary transmission
(n = 22) (n = 76)
Factors n % n % OR 95%CI p-value
Demographics
Age
- < = 24 4 18.2% 19 25.0% 1.00 (Ref)
- 25 to 49 12 54.5% 49 64.5% 1.16 (0.33–4.06) 0.812
- 50 and above 6 27.3% 8 10.5% 3.56 (0.79–16.14) 0.099
Female gender (vs male) 19 86.4% 60 78.9% 1.69 (0.44–6.43) 0.442
Non-Chinese ethnicity (vs Chinese) 6 27.3% 34 44.7% 0.46 (0.16–1.31) 0.148
Epidemiological features
Context of exposure to SARS
- healthcare worker 7 31.8% 50 65.8% 1.00 (Ref)
- hospital inpatient 6 27.3% 4 5.3% 10.70 (2.41–47.6) 0.002
- *others 9 40.9% 22 28.9% 2.92 (0.97–8.85) 0.058
Date of onset
- 21/3/03 or earlier (before universal PPE) 18 81.8% 60 78.9% 1.00 (Ref)
- 22/3//03 or later (after universal PPE) 4 18.2% 16 21.1% 1.61 (0.49–5.32) 0.437
Delayed isolation (on Day 7 or later) 16 72.7% 18 23.7% 8.59 (2.93–25.23) <0.001
Ever admitted to a non-isolation ward 11 50.0% 1 1.3% 75.00 (8.8–639.18) <0.001
Clinical features
Chronic illness
- chronic respiratory illness 5 22.7% 2 2.6% 10.88 (1.94–60.92) 0.007
- disease with immunosuppression 5 22.7% 5 6.6% 4.18 (1.09–16.08) 0.038
Disease severity at time of isolation
- had an abnormal chest radiograph 15 68.2% 63 82.9% 0.44 (0.15–1.3) 0.138
- required oxygen therapy 7 31.8% 7 9.2% 4.60 (1.4–15.08) 0.012
- admitted to ICU or HD 4 18.2% 0 0.0% NC
- intubated 2 9.1% 0 0.0% NC
Signs and symptoms at time of isolation
- temperature > = 38oC 16 72.7% 58 76.3% 0.83 (0.28–2.43) 0.731
- fever 21 95.5% 74 97.4% 0.57 (0.05–6.57) 0.65
- cough 13 59.1% 42 55.3% 1.17 (0.45–3.06) 0.75
- dyspnoea 9 40.9% 15 19.7% 2.82 (1.01–7.81) 0.047
- vomiting 8 36.4% 9 11.8% 4.25 (1.4–12.95) 0.011
- diarrhoea 6 27.3% 8 10.5% 3.19 (0.97–10.48) 0.056
^Laboratory investigations
- alanine aminotransferase >41IU/L 7 31.8% 17 22.4% 1.62 (0.57–4.61) 0.367
- maximum lactate dehydrogenase >650IU/L 14 63.6% 10 13.2% 11.55 (3.87–34.49) <0.001
- minimum platelet count < = 184*10^9/L 8 36.4% 16 21.1% 2.14 (0.77–6) 0.147
- maximum neutrophil count >5.04*10^9/L 11 50.0% 13 17.1% 4.85 (1.74–13.53) 0.003
- minimum lymphocyte count < = 0.93*10^9/L 9 40.9% 15 19.7% 2.82 (1.01–7.81) 0.047
*others: original imported index patient and hospital visitors
^unit of measurement as in Table 1
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lation has been previously noted by Lipsitch and col-
leagues [14], we note that the strongest predictor for
transmission having occurred is admission to a non-isola-
tion ward. This has previously been suspected based on
outbreak descriptions from healthcare settings. For exam-
ple, in an outbreak of SARS among hospital workers in a
community hospital in Hong Kong, it was observed that
most staff was infected from exposure to patients with
unsuspected SARS in non-isolation wards [15]. Similar
observations of nosocomial transmission arising from
unsuspected, non-isolated cases of SARS have been made
across different countries and different hospital settings.
These include other community hospitals [16,17], acute
care wards [5,18,19], intensive care units [20,21], and
emergency rooms [22,23]. While such descriptive
accounts may be faulted on the basis of reporting biases,
we were able to confirm through this analytic study that
index patients admitted without isolation precautions
were much more likely to result in secondary transmission
of SARS.
In addition, we are able to show the association of patient
factors with transmission probability. While multiple
symptoms and clinical manifestations are significantly
associated with transmission in the univariate analysis,
variables such as oxygen dependency, prior history of co-
morbid illness, higher neutrophil counts and lactate dehy-
drogenase levels are correlated to each other and to dis-
ease severity [24,25]. It was not surprising therefore that,
in the multivariate analysis, only the strongest predictor of
disease severity is retained. Higher levels of lactate dehy-
drogenase had previously been found to be one of the best
correlates of severe disease [26]. As higher viral loads have
also been found to be associated with more severe disease
[27], it would hence be reasonable to hypothesize that
higher viral loads may be the underlying mechanism for
the increased risk of transmission in patients who are
more severely ill.
Although no one has directly linked viral load to infec-
tiousness, others have previously observed an association
between disease severity in the index patient and disease
transmission. Shen and colleagues found an association
between disease severity, defined as eventual progression
to death, and the extent of transmission, although their
findings were based only on a univariate analysis of four
super-spreading events against 73 other case-patients [5].
Numerous outbreak reports, including incidents of trans-
mission in intensive care units [19,21], the key super-
spreading event in hotel M [28], the outbreak in Vietnam
[29], as well as the flight from Hong Kong to Beijing on
which 13 passengers were infected [30], all involved index
patients who succumbed to their illness shortly after.
It would appear therefore that, not only is disease severity
associated with the probability of transmission, but it is
also a factor in the intensity of transmission. The link may
lie in the number of susceptible contacts exposed to such
Table 4: Predictive model showing probability of transmission for index patients with different combinations of risk factors
Risk factor combination, sorted by decreasing probability 
of transmission
Total index 
patients in 
group
Cumulative % 
of all patients
Predicted 
probability of 
transmission
Expected no. 
with 
transmission
Observed no. 
with 
transmission
Delayed isolation + Admitted non-isolation + lactate 
dehydrogenase >650 IU/L
7 7.1% 0.969 6.78 6
Delayed isolation + Admitted non-isolation 2 9.2% 0.867 1.73 2
Admitted non-isolation + lactate dehydrogenase >650 IU/L 3 12.2% 0.828 2.48 3
Delayed isolation + lactate dehydrogenase >650 IU/L 6 18.4% 0.565 3.39 3
Admitted non-isolation only Nil 18.4% 0.504 - -
Delayed isolation only 19 37.8% 0.215 4.09 5
Lactate dehydrogenase >650 IU/L only 8 45.9% 0.168 1.34 2
No risk factors 53 100.0% 0.041 2.17 1
Table 3: Multivariate analysis of factors associated with transmission
Features OR (95% CI) p-values
Epidemiological features
Delayed isolation (on Day 7 or later) 6.43 (1.66–24.84) 0.007
Ever admitted to a non-isolation ward 23.83 (2.41–235.27) 0.007
Laboratory investigations
- maximum lactate dehydrogenase >650IU/L 4.73 (1.14–19.65) 0.032
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severely ill patients, and follow-up studies on the Singa-
pore data are in progress to verify this hypothesis.
Our findings have several key implications. Firstly,
because admission to non-isolation wards was the most
important predictor of secondary transmission, good
case-detection and infection control at the point of entry
into the inpatient healthcare setting is a priority area in
the management of SARS outbreaks. Secondly, we have
shown through our predictive model that there is a vast
and real difference in the risk of transmission between dif-
ferent index patients. In the majority of cases, with no risk
factors, the predicted probability of secondary transmis-
sion is small, whereas in those with a combination of the
various factors, the risk of transmission is many times
greater. Moreover, as Lloyd-Smith and colleagues pointed
out, this variability in transmission risk amongst cases is
not restricted to SARS, but may be common to other infec-
tious diseases [8]. This raises the possibility that manage-
ment of future outbreaks of emerging and re-emerging
infectious diseases should include real-time analysis of
clinical and epidemiological correlates similar to the one
we have performed, so as to facilitate targeted outbreak
interventions.
We acknowledge several limitations and weaknesses in
our study. Firstly, the assessment of epidemiological link-
ages was partially subjective, and dependant on the infor-
mation volunteered by index patients and family
members. However, close to 7 out of every 10 infected
contacts were healthcare workers and household mem-
bers (data not shown), for which epidemiological link-
ages were obvious, and we are hence confident that the 22
index patients analysed as "cases" did transmit SARS to at
least one other individual. The key weakness of our study
therefore, is whether some of the index patients analysed
as "controls" actually caused undetected transmission.
With regards to this, we note that, within TTSH itself, 18
of 105 individuals infected in TTSH could not be defi-
nitely linked to a single index patient by the criteria we
used. Of these, 3 were suspected to be linked to 3 of the
index patients which were already classified as "cases" on
the basis of having infected other individuals, 10 were
exposed to multiple index cases within one single ward
where a super-spreading event had occurred, and in 5
individuals we could not trace the infection to a specific
source case or even a definite location within TTSH. In
addition, any of our 76 controls could also have caused
asymptomatic secondary infections, and we hence
acknowledge that some bias from misclassification of
"cases" as "controls" would be inherent in our study.
However, we believe that comparing the index patients
which caused secondary transmission against a set of
imperfect controls is a superior approach to simply draw-
ing qualitative conclusions on possible factors associated
with transmission based on descriptions of index patients
with transmission, and we have done so while attempting
to minimise biases by the use of fairly stringent criteria in
linking any index patients and secondary infections. We
also acknowledge that recall and interviewer bias could
have affected ascertainment of symptomatology and the
timing onset. However, the other key findings of admis-
sion to a non-isolation ward and having higher lactate
dehydrogenase levels are fairly objective criteria. Thirdly,
the number of patients who transmitted was small. Con-
sequently, the study may have lacked power to identify
some important risk factors. The small number of events
also contributed to the wide confidence intervals for some
of the odds ratios. Also, unmeasured confounders could
have affected the results of the study. In particular, other
than including a variable for admission to non-isolation
wards, we did not measure the characteristics of exposed
susceptible individuals and the environmental circum-
stances surrounding the index patients. These would have
included the size and configuration of households
exposed to these index patients, and for patients admitted
to non-isolation wards, the type of wards and any proce-
dures the index patients were subjected to, as these may
have resulted in differences in opportunities for transmis-
sion. Household factors have been explored in other work
[10,11] but hospital-related factors remain a subject for
future research, and would require a larger dataset of
index patients admitted to non-isolation wards, or meth-
odologies treating entire wards rather than individual
index patients as the unit of analysis. In the absence of
more detailed data and a larger dataset on household and
hospital-related circumstances surrounding the index
patients, we have opted simply to group the combined
effect of transmission in these settings, and hence cannot
rule out the possibility that unmeasured factors in the
household and hospital environment may have con-
founded our findings. However, while we could not
adjust for these potential confounders, it must be noted
that those factors found to be significant in the multivari-
ate analysis had reasonably high odds ratios, indicating
that any residual confounding are less likely to affect our
conclusions. Finally, we acknowledge that the predictive
model derived from the study needs to be validated exter-
nally against retrospective data from other countries, or
through prospective data, in the unfortunate event that
SARS re-emerges. This is particularly since the infectious-
ness of the virus is likely to vary between strains. Inter-
strain variations in infectiousness was not likely to be an
important confounder in our study, since all the index
cases here were within a few generations of the original
imported case which started the outbreak in Singapore.
However, any re-emergence of the virus would possibly
involve a strain with fairly different features, and hence
extreme caution should be exercised in generalising our
results to any future outbreaks. However, the final model
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presented in this study does explain to a large extent the
variability in transmission that was observed during the
outbreak, and the prominent role of healthcare institu-
tions and severely ill patients in the propagation of the
outbreak.
In the event of a future outbreak of SARS, our analysis pro-
vides a starting point for risk assessment and risk commu-
nication. Our study also makes the case for the timely
collation and correlation of clinical with epidemiologic
data. In any future outbreak of emerging and re-emerging
infectious diseases, such analyses may well allow index
patients with higher transmission probability to be iden-
tified, and consequently facilitate better targeting of out-
break control measures.
Conclusion
In this observational study amongst probable SARS
patients, we have found that delayed isolation, admission
to a non-isolation ward, and higher lactate dehydrogenase
levels were independently and significantly associated
with increased transmission risk. Our paper is the first
analytic study to demonstrate the above associations
while adjusting for possible confounders. Our final regres-
sion model based on these three factors, while not perfect,
does explain some of the variability in transmission
between cases. It also hints that a similar approach may be
possible for other emerging and re-emerging infectious
diseases, if data on epidemiological data on transmission
can be linked to clinical and laboratory data in real-time.
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